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Although the prominence and notoriety of agents in the
world of sports is a relatively recent phenomenon, scandals
caused by some members of this newly born profession soon
followed. With few notable exceptions, agency representation
of professional athletes was generally nonexistent fifteen to
twenty years ago.1 However, by 1977 the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Select Committee on Professional Sports issued a re-
port containing a scathing commentary on sports agents.2
While testimony before the Committee revealed that almost all
players conducted contract negotiations through representa-
tives, or "player agents," there was also testimony which char-
acterized some of these individuals as "frauds" and "parasites."3
Despite revelations of gross misconduct, no federal regulations
were enacted to rectify the situation. Instead, player agent reg-
ulations originated from some of the athletic associations (most
notably the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),
the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
and the Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes
(ARPA))4 as well as from the California legislature in the form
* Adam B. Nimoy is an associate in the entertainment department of Wood,
Lucksinger & Epstein, a national law firm.
** Jackson D. Hamilton is the partner in charge of the business department of
Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein.
1. Sobel, The Regulation of Player Agents, ENT. L REP., Mar. 1984, at 4, col. 1.
2. HousE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS, FINAL REPORT, H. R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 73-74 (1977) [herein-
after cited as REPORT]; see also infra note 16.
3. REPORT, aUPr note 2.
4. For a discussion of NCAA, NFLPA, and ARPA agency regulations, see infra
notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
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of the Athlete Agencies Act (the "Act").5
The athletic association regulations and the Act are not
above critical commentary. Both the regulations and the Act
are plagued by a range of problems involving proper jurisdic-
tional scope, application and enforcement. The regulations, for
example, are too limited: the NCAA regulations apply only to
college athletes; the NFLPA regulations apply only to agents
representing NFL players; and the ARPA regulations apply
only to player agents who voluntarily join that organization.6
Conversely, the Athlete Agencies Act has been criticized for
being too broad. The Act applies to "athlete agencies," which
were originally defined to effectively include player agents who
also happened to be attorneys, a profession already regulated
by the California State Bar Act.7 Although the statutory defi-
nition of "athlete agencies" excluded attorneys when "acting as
legal counsel,"" the exemption proved to be illusory since both
player agents and sports attorneys engage in similar activities
on behalf of sports figure clients. 9 In an effort to resolve the
consequential uncertainty of the Act's application to attorneys
as well as other important issues, Senate Bill No. 11 (SB 11), an
amendment to the Act, was signed into law on September 20,
1985.10
In order to assess the potential of SB 11, to deal with the is-
sue of the Act's application to attorneys and its potential to re-
solve inherent problems in the player agent profession, an
analysis of the Act, before and after its amendment, is essential.
And an analysis of a statutory system regulating player agents
gains perspective only in the context of its rationale: the poten-
tial problems which can and do develop between athletes and
agents, and the limited ability of the athletic associations to ef-
fectively deal with them.
5. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1986).
6. See infra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b)-(d).
8. Id. § 1500(b).
9. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
10. SB 11 was introduced by Senator Joseph Montoya on December 3, 1984, and
amended in the Senate on April 10, 25 and 29, 1985, and in the Assembly on July 9 and
August 30, 1985. The new law became effective January 1, 1986. Telephone confer-
ence with the Select Committee on Licensed and Designated Sports (Oct. 15, 1985).
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II
The Emergence of the Player Agent
In recent years, the representation of players by player
agents in sports negotiations has become increasingly common-
place." In essence, the player agent profession has grown out
of a practical need to have qualified representatives maximize
an athlete's earning potential by performing various services
for the athlete, including the negotiation of personal services
contracts which, to the layman athlete, may seem extremely
complicated.12 In this respect, the role of the player associa-
tions on behalf of its athletes is limited. With few exceptions,
the associations are, by definition, organized for the purpose of
collective bargaining on behalf of their entire membership
rather than for individual players.'3 Up until roughly the last
five years, anyone could fill the void left by the player associa-
tions by simply becoming a player agent, and a number of un-
qualified individuals did just that.14
The laundry list of abuses attributed to those agents who
happen to be incompetent and unscrupulous generally consists
of the following: fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation of
funds, breach of fiduciary relations, conflicts of interest and fee
gouging.' 5 Without going into specific examples for each of
these types of activities, the following case histories are indica-
tive of what can happen."°
In 1972, Richard Sorkin, a newspaper reporter, began repre-
senting hockey and basketball players. Under his agency
agreements, he was to collect and invest his clients' paychecks.
Having little knowledge of the stock market, Sorkin managed
11. REPORT, supra note 2, at 70.
12. 1l at 70-71; Note, Regulating the Professional Sports Agent: Is California in
the Right Ballpark? 15 PAC. L. J. 1231, 1232-34, 1237 (1984). For a list of other services
player agents may perform for athletes, see R. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO
AGENTS 15-18 (1983).
13. REPORT, supra note 2, at 71. During the hearings, the executive directors of
the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) and the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA) testified that a potential conflict of interest
arises when the head of a players' association represents individual members; the ex-
ecutive director of the World Hockey Association (WHA) and the general counsel of
the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) saw no such conflict. Id. at 72.
For situations in which a possible conflict of interest may arise, see id. at 77.
14. Sobel, supra note 1, at 4; R. RUxIN, upra note 12, at 22.
15. See, e-g., REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
16. For an extensive bibliography of newspaper and magazine articles concerning
player agent scandals, see R. RUxIN, upra note 12, at 160.
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to lose nearly $1,000,000 of his clients' money. Attempts to
recoup these losses at the race track proved equally unsuccess-
ful. By 1977, Sorkin pled guilty to seven counts of larceny and
received a three year prison sentence. 17
Norman Young, an accountant, represented football players
and managed their money through his agency, Probus Manage-
ment, Inc.' Players' paychecks were sent directly to Probus
with the understanding that the money would be used to pay
bills and make investments on behalf of the players. Soon after
Probus signed a number of prominent NFL players, problems
became apparent. Some players found their bills and taxes
went unpaid, while others found their money unavailable on
demand. In 1973 the NFLPA filed suit on behalf of some play-
ers, but to no avail-Young and Probus already had a number
of unsatisfied court judgments against them. Players' losses
were estimated at over $150,000.
In the realm of amateur sports, problems arise in situations
where agents approach college athletes in order to procure an
athlete's promise to engage the agent once the athlete goes pro-
fessional. Such agreements violate the NCAA rules because
they run counter to the principle of amateurism in intercollegi-
ate athletics, where the athlete is to be motivated by "educa-
tional, physical, mental and social benefits" rather than
potential monetary awards after graduation.'9 In an attempt to
circumvent the NCAA's prohibition of contracts between col-
lege athletes and agents, Mike Trope, a Los Angeles agent, de-
vised the "offer sheet."20 The offer sheet was essentially a
written offer by a college athlete to Trope requesting represen-
tation once the athlete decided to go professional. Because the
offer was not to be accepted by Trope until the athlete went
pro, theoretically no enforceable contract could be said to exist
17. People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County Ct. Nov. 28, 1977), affd, 407
N.Y.S.2d 772 (App. Div. 1978); Note, Agents of Professional Athletes, 15 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 545, 568-69 (1980); Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professional
and Amateur Sports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for Regulation,
.30 BUFFALO L. REv. 815, 820-21 (1981); Note, supra note 12, at 1231, 1236-37 (1984).
18. See generally REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74.
19. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1. Section 1(c) provides that "[a]ny individual who
contracts or who has ever contracted orally or in writing to be represented by an
agent in the marketing of the individual's athletic ability or reputation in a sport no
longer shall be eligible for intercollegiate athletics in that sport."
20. For a detailed discussion of offer sheets, see Note, The Offer Sheet An At-
tempt to Circumvent NCAA Prohibition of Representational Contracts, 14 LoY. L.A.L.
REv. 187 (1980).
[Vol. 7
CALIFORNIA ATHLETE AGENCIES ACT
until that time. Nonetheless, the NCAA considered this a vio-
lation of its rules against solicitation.'
III
The Role of the Player Associations
As a result of the failure of the U.S. Congress to enact a com-
prehensive licensing scheme, until quite recently player agents
remained essentially unregulated.2 The virtual void of player
agent regulations was ineffectively filled by the general princi-
ples of agency law and the rules and regulations governing li-
censed attorneys who acted as player agents.3 Yet, until the
introduction of the Athlete Agencies Act in 1981, the only form
of player agent regulation per se was through the independent
efforts of the athletic associations.
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
The NCAA has set up a voluntary "Player Agent Registra-
tion Program" which is designed to maintain the integrity of
amateur athletics. The NCAA constitution provides that if a
player contracts to be represented by an agent the player's eli-
gibility to engage in intercollegiate athletics will be forfeited.24
To implement this policy, the NCAA requests that player
agents register with that organization by supplying information
about their educational and professional background, and by
signing a written agreement to notify the director of athletics
before contacting student athletes or their coaches.' Lists of
21. Id. at 188; Sobel, supra note 1, at 3.
22. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
23. It should be noted that under California law, agents per se are subject to fidu-
ciary obligations owed to their clients, which obligations are not always observed. See
generaly CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2020, 2306, 2322 (West 1985); Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal.
2d 214, 224, 169 P.2d 371, 376 (1946); Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., 35 Cal. 2d
170, 173,217 P.2d 25,27 (1950); Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67
Cal. App. 3d 19, 31, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 386 (1977); Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6
Cal. App. 3d 860, 871, 86 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1970); Kennard v. Glick, 183 Cal. App. 2d
246, 250-51, 7 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1960).
24. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c), quoted supra note 19. The NCAA does not pro-
hibit attorneys from counseling student athletes concerning proposed professional
sports contracts.
25. Letter (headed Memorandum) from the NCAA to "Individuals Acting in the
Capacity of Player Agent" (Aug. 24, 1984) (regarding "1984-85 Player Agent Registra-
tion Program") [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. For a player agent registration
packet, write:
The National Collegiate Athletic Association
No. 4]
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registered agents will then made available to NCAA member
institutions, who have counseling panels intended to provide in-
formation about careers in professional sports and evaluations
of player agents.
An agent's name may be removed from the registration list if
the agent engages in activities that would jeopardize an ath-
lete's eligibility, or if the agent fails to contact the appropriate
individual prior to contacting the student or the student's
coach.26 Nevertheless, participation in the program is volun-
tary and if any NCAA rules are violated, the athlete, rather
than the agent, stands to lose the most by becoming ineligible
to engage in intercollegiate athletics.' Furthermore, despite
these measures to protect the sanctity of amateur athletics,
gifts of money and other items given to players by agents in
order to secure agency representation have become increas-
ingly, if not blatantly, rampant."
B. The National Football League Players Association
Pursuant to the certification of the NFLPA as the exclusive
bargaining unit for NFL players and the NFLPA's collective
bargaining agreement of December 1982, the NFLPA has at-
tempted to upgrade the quality of representation in individual
contract negotiations by adopting the Regulations Governing
Contract Advisors (the "Regulations"), through which it ac-
tively regulates or "certifies" player agents.2  The NFLPA has
P.O. Box 1906
Mission, Kan. 66201
26. Memorandum, supra note 25.
27. See NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c), quoted supra note 19.
28. See California Sports: Sports Agents, July 2, 1983: Interim Hearing on AB
440, 1981, Before the California Senate Select Comm. on Licensed and Designated
Sports [hereinafter cited as Hearings I] (statements of Gene Upshaw at 11; Jeffrey
Walsh at 13); California Sports: Regulation of Player Agents October 15, 1984: In-
terim Hearing on S.8 11, Before the California Senate Select Comm. on Licensed and
Designated Sports [hereinafter cited as Hearings 11] (statements of Jeffrey Walsh at 4,
6; Gene Upshaw at 9; Paul Bossenmaier at 22; David Meggyesy at 26). Attorney and
player agent Leigh Steinberg also indicated his concurrence with this view in a tele-
phone interview with the authors on February 14, 1985. But see Hearings II, state-
ment of Mike Trope at 44, 46-47 (claiming that the college coaches create the problem
of solicitation and that most players are already ineligible by the time they are con-
tacted by an agent).
29. NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CoNTRAcT ADvISORS (1983) at 2 [hereinaf-
ter cited as NFLPA REGS.]. For a copy of the Regulations, write:
National Football League Players Association
Agent Certification
1300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
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made certification and compliance with the Regulations
mandatory prerequisites for individuals wishing to represent
NFL players in individual contract negotiations with NFL
clubs.3° The Regulations, which became effective September 4,
1983, are an extensive and detailed attempt to regulate agents.
Section 1 deals with the intended scope of the Regulations.
Section 2 pertains to requirements for certification as a contract
advisor, which include the filing of an application and compli-
ance with the Regulations. This section also states the grounds
for denial of certification, which include prior criminal acts or
"[a]ny other conduct which adversely affects the competence,
credibility, or integrity of the applicant." Section 3 provides
that players must request agent representation, and that the
request be verified with the NFLPA. Section 4 pertains to con-
tracts and fees. It provides that advisors must sign written rep-
resentation agreements on NFLPA forms and mail copies of
the agreements to the NFLPA. The continued validity of the
agreement is contingent on the agent remaining certified as a
contract advisor. The fee provisions set the maximum rate of
an advisor's compensation at ten percent which amount de-
clines for each successive contract year based on a specified
schedule. Furthermore, the percentage rates are based on com-
pensation actually received by the player and only for amounts
which are in excess of the minimum annual salary payable to
the player.
Section 5, entitled "Requirements Concerning Contract Ad-
visor's Conduct," is designed to assure effective representation
by requiring that advisors avoid conflicts of interest; disclose
their qualifications for representing athletes; remain educated
about the structure, economics and collective bargaining agree-
ments of the league; comply with state and federal laws and
regulations; and attend annual NFLPA briefings on individual
contract negotiations. Advisors are prohibited from maintain-
ing any financial interest in professional sports teams, are re-
Suite 407
Washington, D.C. 20036
Regarding the certification of player associations under the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the relationship of the associations to the National Labor Relations
Act, see generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS, §§ 6.0-6.11 (1979),
and L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, 267-329 (1977).
30. NFLPA RECs., supra note 29, at 1, 2. The NFLPA has currently registered




quired to disclose representation of NFL management
personnel and must keep the NFLPA informed of develop-
ments in negotiations. Finally, advisors are prohibited from
soliciting players by giving gifts to players or referral sources,
or by providing misleading credentials.
Section 6, entitled "Oversight and Compliance Procedure,"
provides for the appointment of a three-man disciplinary com-
mittee (comprised of active or retired players) which is in
charge of disciplining contract advisors who violate the Regula-
tions. This section sets forth the procedures for hearing com-
plaints, the types of disciplinary action (which include
reprimands, fines and certification suspension and revocation)
as well as the procedure for appeals. Section 7 pertains to the
rules governing the arbitration of disputes between contract ad-
visors and players.
The Regulations clearly apply to all persons who represent
NFL players in individual contract negotiations with NFL
clubs. The activities they govern, defined in section 1, include
the negotiating and drafting of special provisions of player con-
tracts-activities regularly performed by attorneys. However,
as with the NCAA rules, the scope of the Regulations is limited
because they apply only to agents representing NFL players.
This excludes agents representing athletes in other sports and
even those representing NFL draftees. 31
C. The Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes
ARPA is an independent nonprofit association of representa-
tives of professional athletes in all sports. Formed in 1978,
ARPA's governing principles are the maintenance of compe-
tence and honesty in the profession through continuing educa-
tion and adherence to ethical standards.3 2 To achieve these
goals, ARPA offers seminars on athlete representation, pub-
lishes a directory listing the backgrounds of and services of-
fered by its members, and has promulgated a Code of Ethics
31. Hearings I, supra note 28 (statement of Gene Upshaw at 37); Hearings II,
supra note 28 (statement of David Meggyesy at 28).
32. ASSOCIATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, MEMBERSHIP
DIRECTORY 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ARPA DIRECTORY].
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designed to upgrade agency representation.33 In general,
ARPA's Code of Ethics contains rules similar to those that ap-
pear in the NFLPA Regulations and the NCAA Constitution
relating to criminal conduct,3 familiarity with bargaining
agreements and league rules,3 student solicitations,' the form
of agency contracts and the resolution of contract disputes.3
ARPA even has rules to regulate agents who offer investment
services to their clients.' Unfortunately, the language of the
Code is too general to be effective, and there is no mechanism
by which it can be enforced since membership in the assocation
is voluntary.
IV
The Athlete Agencies Act
The Athlete Agencies Act was enacted in 1981 as Chapter 929
(Sections 1500-1547) of the California Labor Code.' Since Jan-
uary 1982, all "athlete agencies" representing athletes in sports
contract negotiations have been required to register with the
California Labor Commissioner and to comply with the provi-
sions of the Act.' The purpose. of the Act is, quite simply, to
protect athletes from potential abuse by regulating the player
agent (athlete agencies) profession.41
A. General Provisions
Article 1 of the Athlete Agencies Act, entitled "Definitions,"
33. For ARPA's CODE OF ETHICS and MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY, write:
ARPA




P. O. Box 90053
World Way Postal Center
Los Angeles, Cal. 90009
34. ARPA DIRECTORY, supra note 32, at 3 (Rule 1-101).
35. Id. at 4 (Rule 1-104(C)).
36. Id at 6 (Rule 2-105).
37. Id. at 7 (Rule 3-102).
38. Id. at 3, 5 (Rules 1-103(B), 2-102(B)).
39. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1986).
40. Id. at § 1510.
41. See Hearings , supra note 28 (statements of Gene Upshaw at 11; Jeffrey




is an overview of the intended scope of the Act." Article 2 per-
tains to registration procedures, including matters relating to
applications, renewals, filing fees, the deposit of surety bonds
and registration suspension and revocation.4 Article 3, "Opera-
tion and Management," contains the substantive provisions of
the Act: the approval of agency contracts by the California La-
bor Commissioner; provisions to be included in agency agree-
ments; the filing of fee schedules with the Labor
Commissioner; recordkeeping requirements; transfers of inter-
est in the agency; the referral of disputes to the Labor Commis-
sioner subject to arbitration clauses; contracts between agents
and student athletes; and punishment for violation of the Act."
The Athlete Agencies Act is closely modeled after Califor-
nia's Talent Agencies Act (originally enacted in 1959 as the Art-
ists' Managers Act), which is designed to protect artists seeking
employment in the entertainment industry by regulating talent
agents.'5 The general provisions of the two acts are quite simi-
lar, although the Athlete Agencies Act merely requires agents
to register with the Labor Commissioner while the Talent
Agencies Act requires agents to procure a license from the
Commissioner.46 A comparison of the two acts will help to
highlight some potential problems that are likely to arise under
the Athlete Agencies Act.
B. Jurisdictional Scope and Application
The Talent Agencies Act and the Athlete Agencies Act both
suffer from problems concerning intended scope and applica-
tion. The major problem of the Talent Agencies Act is its appli-
cation to personal managers in the entertainment industry. 7
42. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500 (West Supp. 1986).
43. Id. at §§ 1510-1528.
44. Id at §§ 1530-1547.
45. The Talent Agencies Act is codified at CAL LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West
Supp. 1986).
Regarding the design and purposes of the Act, see Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254
Cal. App. 2d 347, 350-51, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 367 (1967); Hearings I, supra note 28 (state-
ments of Jeffrey Walsh at 10; Carol Cole at 28); 1981 CAL. STAT. c. 929, Legislative
Counsel's Digest.
46. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1510, 1546, 1700.3, 1700.5.
47. See generally Johnson & Lang, The Personal Manager in the California En-
tertainment Industry, 52 S. CAi. L. REV. 375 (1979); Comment, Personal Managers
and the Talent Agencies Act; For Whom the Bill Toils, 2 Loy. ENT. L.J. 145 (1982);
Note, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legislative Solution, 6
CoMM/ENT L.J. 837 (1984).
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'Talent agency" is defined in section 1700.4 of the California
Labor Code as a "person or corporation who engages in the oc-
cupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to
procure employment or engagements for an artist."' 48 Although
personal managers are known to occasionally procure employ-
ment for their clients, they are not the functional equivalents
of talent agents who procure employment on a daily basis. Per-
sonal managers generally have much smaller client rosters
than agents, and are more involved in counseling and advising
artists, as well as coordinating and supervising all aspects of
their careers. Until the Act was amended in 1982, this distinc-
tion was not recognized by the Labor Commissioner which
often led to devastating results in administrative hearings.
Managers who were found to have procured employment with-
out a license were required to return all commissions ever re-
ceived from their artist clients, including fees paid for
legitimate management services.49 Consequently, the Talent
Agencies Act became a powerful weapon in the hands of artists
who wished to repudiate their contractual obligations to man-
agers since they could do so merely by pleading cases of unli-
censed procurement before the Labor Commissioner.
The Talent Agencies Act was amended in 1982 to rectify the
situation by excluding from the definition of "talent agency"
the procurement of recording contracts in the music industry,
where procurement by unlicensed managers is particularly
acute50 The amendment also added Article 4, which created
the California Entertainment Commission to study the situa-
tion throughout the industry and recommend a model bill to
the California Legislature.3 '
The Athlete Agencies Act also suffers from jurisdictional
problems, but in this case, the problems arise out of the Act's
application to attorneys. Prior to SB 11, "athlete agency" was
48. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4.
49. See, eg., Sinnamon v. McKay, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r,
filed May 8, 1981); McFadden v. Ripp, No. SFMP 71/TAC 7-80 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r,
filed Dec. 18, 1980). For a comprehensive source of the unreported decisions of the
California Labor Commissioner, see ARTIST V. MANAGER REVISED--FURTHER DEVEL.
OPMENTs IN THE REGULATION OF ENTERTAINERS' REPRESENTATIVES, SYLLABUS FOR
THE SYMPOSIUM OF THE BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION (R. Feller ed. June 1, 1985);
ARTIST V. MANAGER V. AGENT V. LABOR COMMISSIONER- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REG-
ULATION OF ENTERTAINERS' REPRESENTATIVES, SYLLABUS FOR THE SYMPOSIUM OF THE
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION (R. Feller ed. Nov. 12,1983).
50. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4.
51. Id. §§ 1701-1704.
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defined as any person who solicits another "to enter into any
agency contract or professional sports services contract, or for a
fee procures, offers, promises, or attempts to obtain employ-
ment for any person with a professional sport team. ' 52 The Act
further provided that the term "athlete agency" excluded
members of the State Bar of California "when acting as legal
counsel," a phrase which was not defined.53 In essence, the
above definition distinguishes between attorneys who procure
sports services contracts on behalf of athletes, and attorneys
who merely "act as legal counsel," the latter being excluded
from the scope of the Act. In theory, the distinction makes
sense because legal practitioners are already regulated by the
California judiciary through its administrative arm, the State
Bar of California.54 In reality, however, a close look at the stat-
utory definition reveals that the boundary between athlete
agent and attorney is nebulous. 5
The term "athlete agency" is defined to include any person
who solicits another individual to enter into an agency con-
tract.e An "agency contract" is one which empowers an agent
to "negotiate" or "solicit" employment on behalf of the ath-
lete.57 This provision alone effectively eliminates the "acting as
legal counsel" exemption, as contract negotiation is integral to
the practice of law and is the primary service which attorneys
render to athletes.s "Athlete agency" is also defined to include
any person who, for a fee, procures or attempts to procure em-
ployment for an athlete with a professional sports team.59
52. Id. § 1500(b).
53. Id. As a practical matter, many sports attorneys are not registered under the
Act based upon the legal counsel exemption. Hearings I, supra note 28 (statement of
Andy Richey at 20); Telephone interview with Leigh Steinberg (Feb. 14, 1985).
54. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6075-6078, 6100 (West
1974 & Supp. 1986). See also Jacobs v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 191, 570 P.2d 1230, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1977); Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153
(1962); People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 89, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978).
55. "Agent" is defined in California Civil Code § 2295 as "one who represents an-
other, called the principal, in dealings with third persons. Such representation is
called agency." In California Business & Professions Code § 6151(b), an "agent" is
defined as "one who represents another in dealings with one or more third persons."
Thus, "agent" may be considered as a generic term which encompasses attorneys.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(c).
58. See Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 542, 469 P.2d 353, 357, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 673, 677 (1970); Hearings II, supra note 28 (statement of Ted Steinberg, Esq. at
13, 15).
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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Although "procuring" or obtaining employment is not tradi-
tionally a legal function, it is sometimes engaged in by attor-
neys incidentally to their primary function of contract
negotiation.60 This process is not accounted for under the Act.
Furthermore, the Labor Commissioner, in construing the Tal-
ent Agencies Act,6 has defined the term "procurement" to in-
clude the legal function of contract negotiation. 2 If the
Athlete Agencies Act is similarly construed, attorneys who ne-
gotiate sports services contracts will fall outside the "legal
counsel" exemption. The potential danger is that the Labor
Commissioner may impose onerous sanctions against attorneys
who unlawfully procure employment for athletes, just as per-
sonal managers were disciplined for unlawful procurement of
employment for artists in the entertainment industry under
the Talent Agencies Act.
SB 11 is designed, in part, to resolve this issue by adding sec-
tion 6106.7 to the Business and Professions Code (State Bar
Act). Subsection 6106.7(a) states that an attorney will be sub-
ject to discipline if he or she negotiates a sports services con-
tract and collects a fee "that in any calendar year exceeds ten
percent of the compensation the athlete is receiving in that cal-
endar year under the contract."'as This provision appears to de-
fer the regulation of contract negotiation by attorneys to the
jurisdiction of the State Bar. However, the Act's original defi-
60. In fact, the procurement process generally plays a limited role in team sports
altogether. Unlike talent agents in the entertainment industry, player agents in team
sports do not regularly find jobs for their clients since most athletes are drafted by
sports teams. The procurement process is generally limited to athletes who are "free
agents," i.e., those players who have not been drafted or whose contracts have ex-
pired. This process is further limited because the term of a player's contract is mea-
sured in years, whereas the term of a personal service entertainment contract is
generally measured in terms of weeks. Hearings II, supra note 28 (statements of Ted
Steinberg, Esq. at 13, 15; Tom Rankin at 64). See also R. RUXIN, supra note 12.
With respect to attorneys who do engage in procurement, the Act fails to distin-
guish between those attorneys with large client rosters who engage in procurement
on a regular albeit limited basis, and those attorneys with fewer clients who rarely if
ever engage in this practice. Hearings II, supra note 28 (statements of David Meggy-
esy at 27; Jim Armstrong at 58).
61. The California Labor Commissioner has original jurisdiction to hear contro-
versies arising under the Athlete Agencies Act and the Talent Agencies Act. CAL.
LA. CODE §§ 1528, 1530, 1543, 1700.44 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986). For the validity of
arbitration clauses contained in athlete agency contracts, see id. § 1544.
62. Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC 17 MP 114 at 14-15 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r, filed Aug.
12, 1982); Fisher v. Shepard, No. AMC 7-78 MP 453 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r, filed Jan. 23,
1981).
63. See also itrva note 97 and accompanying text.
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nition of athlete agency ("athlete agent" under SB 11), its ex-
emption for "acting as legal counsel," and its definition of
"agency contract" remain intact. Although the ten percent fee
maximum reflects an industry standard," it may prove prob-
lematic in the event an athlete desires to buy out the attorney's
interest in the remaining years of the athlete's contract for a
sum in excess of ten percent of the contract income for that
year. Finally, it is unclear whether the ten percent fee maxi-
mum applies only to fees for services rendered in connection
with contract procurement or to all fees for any services ren-
dered in a given year.
Subsection 6106.7(b) of the new addition to the State Bar Act
makes the violations of any of five specific sections of the Ath-
lete Agencies Act "cause for the imposition of discipline. '
Those sections pertain to the form of an agency contract (Cali-
fornia Labor Code section 1530.5), fee schedules (new subsec-
tions 1531(b), (c)), conflicts of interest (new sections 1535.5 and
1535.7), and client solicitation (amended section 1539). By
cross-referencing certain sections of the Athlete Agencies Act
into the State Bar Act, SB 11 again relinquishes the regulation
of sports attorneys to the State Bar, the significance of which is
more fully discussed below.
In addition to being overly extensive in its application to at-
torneys, the Athlete Agencies Act may, paradoxically, be
viewed as too limited. Under the provisions of the original Act,
"athlete agency" was uniformly defined to include only those
agents representing athletes of professional sports teams.6
This definition effectively excluded representatives of individ-
ual athletes who did not compete in team sports. SB 11 offers
relief by redefining "athlete agent" to include agents represent-
ing athletes who are simply employed as professional athletes.67
Nevertheless, the scope of the Act is still too limited. The Act
does not apply to individuals who are not involved in sports
contract solicitation or negotiations but who do handle an ath-
lete's income, such as accountants and business managers. Nor
does the Act apply to contract procurement outside the area of
64. Id.
65. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.7 (West Supp. 1986).
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b)-(d) (West Supp. 1986).
67. Id. § 1500(b).
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athletics, such as endorsements and commercials.68 Finally, the
Act is completely silent as to whether it applies only to agents
whose principal places of business are in California, or to any
agent who represents athletes residing in California.
V
The Athlete Agencies Act and the State
Bar of California
A. Substantive Provisions
Exempting attorneys from regulation under the Athlete
Agencies Act is important and necessary. Provisions of the Act
often are redundant or conflict with provisions of the State Bar
Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of
California. Violation of the latter provisions may lead to disci-
plinary action as severe as suspension from the practice of law
and disbarment.69 Conversely, cross-referencing of some of the
provisions of the Athlete Agencies Act into the State Bar Act
may serve to supplement the latter since the Act addresses sit-
uations not directly dealt with by the rules and regulations gov-
erning attorneys.
One of the problems addressed by the Athlete Agencies Act
is the solicitation of college students in violation of the NCAA
68. This type of activity would likely fall within the jurisdiction of the Talent
Agencies Act. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4.
69. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
The relationship between the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct and
the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility is as follows:
Members of the State Bar of California are bound to conduct themselves in
accordance with legislative standards which are set forth primarily in the
State Bar Act (Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6000 et seq.) and with Standards ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of California, embodied within the Rules of
Professional Conduct and decisional law. Some of the Rules of Professional
Conduct are derived from the American Bar Association Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, adopted in 1969, as amended ... The provisions of
the American Bar Association Model Code, however, are not grounds for dis-
cipline of members of the Bar in California (See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6077, 6100.)
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA COMPENDIUM ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 1 (1983 as updated 1984) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
The authors acknowledge that the State Bar has recently been criticized for failing
to aggressively enforce its regulations governing attorneys. See, e.g., Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 29, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Nevertheless, forthcoming administrative and legis-
lative changes instill new optimism that the State Bar will be able to more effectively
regulate its membership. Id.; Assembly Bill 1275 as amended July 11, 1985; Andersen,
The New, Improved System, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1985, at 12-13.
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rules.70 The original Act provided that, prior to "communicat-
ing with or contacting in any manner any student concerning
an agency [agent] contract," agents must file copies of their re-
gistration certificates with the school in which the student is
enrolled.71 This provision posed a problem for attorneys who,
with specific exceptions, are prohibited from soliciting clients.7
It is difficult for attorneys to anticipate any contact with a po-
tential client, and therefore impossible for them to comply with
this section of the Act. SB 11 alleviates this problem by delet-
ing this entire section, but keeps intact, and applies to attor-
neys, the requirement that agency contracts contain notices
that an athlete's amateur standing may be jeopardized by en-
tering into the contract.73
Similarly, the old Act provided that "if an agency [agent] con-
tract is entered into with a student, a copy of that contract must
be filed with the school at which the student is enrolled."7 4
This breaches attorney-client confidence75 and, arguably, inter-
feres with the contractual relationship between the parties in
that the decision of a college athlete to enter into an agency
agreement would likely run counter to the college or univer-
sity's desire that its athletes maintain intercollegiate eligibility.
Furthermore, educational institutions appear to be ill-equipped
to handle such contracts.76 SB 11 deletes this entire section.
SB 11 prohibits both attorneys and non-attorneys from offer-
ing anything of value, including discounted or free legal serv-
ices, to employees of universities or educational institutions in
exchange for client referrals.77 The solicitation of professional
70. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1545(a) (West Supp. 1986).
72. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6151-6154 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986);
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Rule 2-101(B)
[hereinafter cited as RuLES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
103(A), 2-104(A); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 454 (1977); Hearings II, supra note 28 (statements of Ronald Russo, Esq.
at 39; Andy Richey at 62). For a discussion of the effects and possible solution to the
non-solicitation rules on sports attorneys, see Comment, Remedying Athlete-Agent
Abuse: A Securities Law Approach, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.R. 53, 55-61 (1984).
73. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1530.5(b).
74. Id. § 1545(b), (c).
75. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 952, 954 (West 1966 & Supp. 1986); Sullivan v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 64,
69, 105 Cal. Rptr. 241, 244 (1972); Hearings II, supra note 28 (statements of Dr. Rich-
ard Perry at 34; Jim Armstrong, Esq. at 55).
76. Hearings II, supra note 28 (statement of Dr. Richard Perry at 36).
77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1539(b).
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athletes is also addressed by SB 11 in amended section 1539(a)
and the new subsections 1539(c) and (d): agents and sports at-
torneys may not split fees with employees of sports leagues or
player associations, nor obtain referrals from unions or player
associations. While attorneys are generally prohibited from cli-
ent solicitation, 7 these new provisions may actually give mean-
ing to this rule in the context of athletics.
The bond requirement of section 1519 is evidence of how the
old Act was redundant in light of the rules governing attorneys.
This section states that, prior to issuance or renewal of registra-
tion, agents must first deposit a $10,000 surety bond ($25,000
under SB 11) with the California Labor Commissioner. 9 The
purpose of the bond is to ensure that the agent complies with
the Act and pays for damages due to "(intentional or uninten-
tional) misstatement, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, or any
unlawful (or negligent) acts or (commissions or) omissions of
the registered athlete agency (agent). . ."'I The application
of the bond requirement to attorneys is superfluous because
many attorneys carry professional liability insurance, and the
State Bar maintains a "Client Security Fund" which serves to
remunerate victimized clients for just this type of behavior.8 '
The State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct also
contain provisions prohibiting the forms of misconduct listed,
the violation of which may lead to suspension or even disbar-
ment. 2 In any event, the bond requirement makes little sense
even if applied only to non-attorney agents since the amount of
78. See supra, note 72.
79. CAL LAB. CODE § 1519.
80. Id. § 1520. (parentheticals refer to language added by SB 11).
81. Although professional liability insurance generally applies only to the negli-
gent acts of an attorney, the Client Security Fund is intended to ". . relieve or miti-
gate pecuniary losses caused by the dishonest conduct of those active members of the
State Bar." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5 (West 1974);-Hearings II, supra note 28
(statement of Andy Richey at 59-61).
82. See generaly, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6068, 6106 (West 1974 & Supp.
1986); RuLES, supra note 72, Rules 2-107, 5-101, 5-102, 8-101.
For the disciplinary authority of the California State Bar, see CAL Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 6077, 6078, 6087, 6211, 6212; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1518 (West Supp. 1986);
CAL. R. CT. Rule 956 (West Supp. 1986); RuLES, supra note 72, Rule 9-101. For the
disciplinary authority of the courts, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6100-6117; Hear-
ing8 II, supra note 28 (statement of Andy Richey, Esq. at 59, 64). According to Mr.
Richey's testimony, the State Bar spends $4-5 million a year enforcing discipline.
For a list of California case citations pertaining to the types of misconduct the Act is
intended to prevent, see the index of COMPENDIUM as follows: pp. 29-34 (client trust
accounts, failure to account to client, commingling and misappropriation); pp. 73-75
(reasonableness of fees); pp. 94-98 (commingling, embezzlement, fraud, gross negli-
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the bond (now $25,000) is miniscule compared to the average
compensation paid to professional sports figures."' This section
of the California Labor Code is not cross-referenced by SB 11
into the State Bar Act and therefore would not apply to
attorneys.
The mandates of the Athlete Agencies Act might be viewed
as inadequate when compared to attorney regulations. This is
particularly true of the qualification requirements of athlete
agents. In order to practice law in the State of California, an
applicant must satisfy specific educational and character re-
quirements, pass a rigorous bar examination and abide by the
extensive rules and regulations of the State Bar which dwarf
the requirements of the Athlete Agencies Act by comparison. 4
In order to qualify for registration under the original Act, an
individual had only to file an application accompanied by affi-
davits of "at least two reputable residents, who have known or
been associated with the applicant for two years" attesting to
the "good moral character" of the applicant."' SB 11 has raised
the standard for non-attorneys as follows:
The application for registration shall be accompanied by affida-
vits or certificates of completion of any and all formal training
or practical experience in any one of the following specific ar-
eas: contracts; contract negotiation; complaint resolution; arbi-
tration or civil resolution of contract disputes. The Labor
Commissioner, in evaluating the applicant's qualifications, may
consider any other relevant training, education, or experience
to satisfy this requirement. s6
Although this provision improves upon the former qualifica-
tion requirement, it would clearly be redundant if applied to
attorneys. Every accredited law school provides "formal train-
ing" in the above listed fields and "practical experience" is
clearly acquired through the practice of law. SB 11 avoids re-
dundancy by exempting attorneys from this section.
Another shortcoming of the original Act, compared to the
gence, misappropriation, misrepresentation and other acts involving moral turpitude).
COMPENDIUM, supra note 69.
Additional annotations for the Rules of Professional Conduct may be found in CAL.
R. CT. (Deering 1980 & Supp. 1985); CAL. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RULES, PROFESSIONAL
RULES, vol. 23, pt. 2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985).
83. Note, supra note 12, at 1243-44.
84. See generally, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060-6068; CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 94,360-94,363 (West 1978); CAL. R. CT. Rule 957.
85. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1511(d).
86. Id.
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rules regulating attorneys, involves the handling of a client's
income. The State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct require
that attorneys set up client trust funds and avoid commin-
gling.'" Violations of these provisions have resulted in discipli-
nary action." The former Athlete Agencies Act had no similar
provision. SB 11, however, adds that "a trust fund shall be es-
tablished when an athlete agent is the recipient of the player's
salary. An athlete agent who receives any payment on behalf
of the athlete shall immediately deposit same in a trust fund
account maintained by the athlete agent or other recognized
depository."8 9 Because the substance of this section is found in
the Rules of Professional Responsibility, this section is not
cross-referenced into the State Bar Act.
Finally, exempting attorneys from the general registration
requirements under the Act is important because the require-
ments make no economic sense when applied to attorneys who
represent a limited number of athletes. In addition to purchas-
ing a surety bond (formerly in the penal sum of $10,000; $25,000
under SB 11), athlete agents must also pay a filing fee (cur-
rently $100), an annual registration fee ($500) and branch office
fees ($150 for each branch office).90 Furthermore, as each regis-
tration applies only to the individual to whom it is issued, the
bond and fees are technically required from all attorneys (in-
cluding those from the same firm) involved in a single contract
negotiatiorL9' Consequently, prior to SB 11, attorneys could ac-
tually end up with out-of-pocket losses by negotiating only a
few contracts for less marketable and lower-paid athletes who
could only afford to pay minimum hourly billing rates.9
B. Administrative Provisions and the Business of Law
The Act also contained a number of procedural requirements
which interfered with administrative practices of law firms
before SB 11 was enacted. Section 1535 requires the written
consent of the Labor Commissioner when a registrant sells,
transfers or gives away "any interest in or the right to partici-
87. RULES, supra note 72, Rule 8-101.
88. See, e.g.; Rogers v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 654, 620 P.2d 1030, 170 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1980).
89. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1531.5 (added under SB 11).
90. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1517-1519.
91. Id. § 1524.
92. Hearings I, supra note 28 (statement of Margaret A. Leonard, Esq. at 16-17).
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pate in the profits of the agency.""3 Stiff fines or jail sentences
are specifically provided for violation of this section. A literal
reading of this provision might indicate that before an associate
can make partner in a law firm containing registered agents, or
indeed before a partner can even leave a firm, the Labor Com-
missioner must first give its approval. 94 Again, SB 11 effec-
tively exempts attorneys from this section by excluding it from
those sections cross-referenced to the State Bar Act, but does
cross-reference section 1535.5, which prohibits an agent from
maintaining an ownership interest in the same sport in which
the agent has athlete clients. Although attorneys are required
to avoid conflicts of interest, this section serves to give meaning
to this rule.95 In addition, section 1535.7 of SB 11 requires
agents to disclose to their clients any financial interest the
agent has in an entity in which the agent advises the client to
invest. This section also applies to attorneys, supplementing
the applicable disclosure requirements imposed upon the legal
profession. 6
Similar to section 1535, section 1531 provides that all changes
in fee schedules must be filed with the Labor Commissioner
and that no change may become effective until seven days after
the filing. Again, read literally, every time the hourly rate of
any single attorney in a law firm changes, the Labor Commis-
sioner must be notified. SB 11 applies only subsections (b) and
(c) of section 1531 to attorneys. These subsections place a ceil-
ing of ten percent on an agent's fee based on the "total compen-
sation, direct or indirect, and no matter from whom received,
the athlete is receiving in that calendar year under the con-
tract,"' 7 and would require all agency contracts to describe the
services to be performed and the fees to be charged.9" The ten
percent cap on fees payable to agents does appear to reflect in-
dustry standards and also supplements the general prohibition
93. See also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1511(d) (amended under SB 11), 1516 (West 1971
& Supp. 1986), which require the disclosure of all partnership interests when applying
for registration.
94. The definitions contained in § 1500 of the California Labor Code seem to indi-
cate that the provisions of the Act apply generally to an entire law firm rather than
merely those attorneys within the firm who are acting as athlete agents.
95. RULES, suprd note 72, Rules 4-101, 5-101, 5-102.
96. Id.
97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 15(b) (added under SB 11).
98. Id. § 1531(c).
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against the charging of unconscionable fees by attorneys."9 Yet
again, SB 11 does not address the situation in which the athlete
wishes to buy out an agent's or attorney's total interest in the
athlete's contract that exceeds the ten percent limitation, nor
does it clarify whether the ten percent ceiling applies to fees for
legal services unrelated to the contract procurement process.
Sections 1532 and 1533 remain essentially unchanged and re-
quire every athlete agent to maintain books and records of all
clients, the fees received from the clients, and "other informa-
tion which the Labor Commissioner requires." Books and
records are to be available for inspection and copying by the
Labor Commissioner. Problems of confidentiality arise be-
cause such documents are privileged information, the produc-
tion of which requires compliance with procedural rules that
conflict with this provision of the Act.1°° SB 11 protects attor-
ney-client confidentiality by excluding this section from those
which are cross-referenced into the State Bar Act.
C. Problems of Enforcement
In addition to the jurisdictional, substantive and administra-
tive problems of the Act, if one considers some of its more prac-
tical shortcomings, it becomes apparent that the protection of
athletes is not necessarily best achieved by statutory regulation
of player agents. For example, since the Act became law over
three years ago, only some forty player agents have been regis-
tered.10 1 The problem appears to be one of enforcement-only
one criminal complaint has been filed to date. 0 2 If the Athlete
Agencies Act is to have any noticeable effect whatsoever, it
must be uniformly and consistently enforced. The threat of re-
gistration revocation and/or the imposition of criminal penal-
ties under the Act will not be effective when so few individuals
are registered.10 3 Until more individuals are registered, the La-
99. Hearings II, aupra note 28 (statement of Ted Steinberg, Esq. at 18); NFLPA
REGs., supra note 29, at 8-11; RULES, supra note 70, Rule 2-107.
100. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6069 (West Supp. 1986); CAL GOV'T CODE
§ 7473 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); CAL EviD. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1966 & Supp.
1986); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1985.3 (West Supp. 1986); Hearings I, supra note 28
(statement of Andy Richey at 62).
101. Telephone interviews with Kathleen Somerton, Senate Committee on Li-
censed and Designated Sports (Apr. 22,1985) and Paul Blyth, California Labor Com-
missioner's office (Feb. 14, 1985).
102. Id.
103. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1527, 1547 (West Supp. 1986).
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bor Commissioner enforces the Act or athletes begin to bring
complaints against agents pursuant to the Act, the critical prob-
lem of enforcement is likely to remain, as SB 11 does not di-
rectly address this issue.
California is the only state with a statutory scheme which
regulates player agents. But, if the evolution of the Talent
Agencies Act is an accurate indication, the Athlete Agencies
Act might become a model for other states. In that event, some
of the Act's shortcomings, such as its problems of scope and en-
forcement, could easily appear in other jurisdictions. Further-
more, agents across the country would be expected to know the




The need for agency representation of athletes is genuine
and, in any case, player agents are here to stay. There is also a
genuine need to regulate agents to insure that they act ethically
and competently. In the final analysis, however, the statutory
regulation of player agents under the auspices of the Labor
Commissioner's office may well be an inadequate method by
which to control the problems inherent in the player agent pro-
fession. Irrespective of the scope and enforcement shortcom-
ings, the Labor Commissioner and his staff are simply not
sufficiently familiar with the nature and practice of the sports
industry to adequately determine who is qualified to be regis-
tered as an agent and how controversies arising between play-
ers and agents are to be resolved. This unfamiliarity is
precisely the problem with the Talent Agencies Act. The Com-
missioner's office has never clearly understood the role of per-
sonal managers in the entertainment industry, which has
resulted in dire consequences for managers.
Undoubtedly, the best method of regulating player agents is
.through the intensified efforts of the player associations. They
are most familiar with problems of, and the appropriate regula-
tions for, player agents in each particular field of sports. An
excellent way to maintain uniformity of regulation within any
given field of athletics would be to allow and encourage the as-
sociations to promulgate their own regulations based on some
of the model principles set forth in the NFLPA Regulations. A
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similar situation already exists in the entertainment industry.
The guilds and unions are the true regulators of talent agents,
having promulgated detailed regulations governing the conduct
of agents, as well as disciplinary rules to enforce the regula-
tions.' 4 This is exactly what the NFLPA has attempted to ac-
complish with its extensive and detailed Regulations Governing
Contract Advisors, under which agents are certified by the
NFL's collective bargaining unit and members of the football
profession are designated to hear complaints against agents.0 5
Nevertheless, the National Football League is only one facet of
professional sports. Until each of the various player's associa-
tions follow the NFLPA's lead and take a more aggressive
stance in regulating agents, statutory regulation-based on the
problematic albeit improved Athlete Agencies Act-is the only
alternative to fill the void.
VII
Conclusion
The Athlete Agencies Act was designed to protect athletes
seeking employment by regulating player or "athlete" agents.
Though intended to mitigate the scandalous excesses of some
agents which have come to light in recent years, problems of
scope, enforcement and other related flaws have prevented the
Act from reaching its objective. By adding needed provisions
and deleting or amending provisions of no value, SB 11 resolves
some of the problems of the Act, particularly those relating to
attorneys. The resolution of the attorney issue is perhaps SB
11's greatest improvement upon the language of the original
Act under which the "legal counsel" exemption had proved
meaningless. It simply makes no sense to apply the Act in its
entirety to sports attorneys who are already licensed and regu-
lated by the State Bar. It does, however, make sense to supple-
ment the State Bar regulations by uniformly applying those
provisions of the Act which are peculiar to the player agent
profession. SB 11 does this by cross-referencing specific sec-
tions of the Act into the State Bar Act sections of the Business
and Professions Code. But SB 11 is not enough. Indeed, the
104. See, e.g., ScREEN ACTORS GUILD, CODIFIED AGENCY REGULATIONSh Rule 16(g);
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS, REGULATIONS GOV-
ERNING AGENTS, Rule 12-B; CONSTITUTION, BY-LAws AND POLICY, AMERICAN FEDERA.
TION OF MUSICIANS, art. 23.
105. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Act itself is little more than a symbolic gesture. The most
promising effective means of player agent regulation is within
the sports industry itself, through the active participation of
the player associations. Nevertheless, the toll of the Bill cer-
tainly sounds of the improvement needed to solve some of the
shortcomings of this statutory system.
